here Personal stories included as well. Apr 08, Haley Baugher rated it really liked it. Gave me a huge insight on what it was like to be in the war as a Vietnamese.
Jan 09, Keti rated it it was amazing Shelves: Quite a thorough view of the different perspectives of the Vietnamese identity from s onwards, especially following the Anti-Colonial and American wars from s Gary rated it liked it Jan 02, Casey rated it it was ok Apr 02, Yuezhong Zheng rated it it was amazing Apr 07, Citlali Meza rated it liked it Sep 03, Laura rated it liked it Sep 23, Vincent Ohler rated it it was amazing Jul 28, Ben rated it really liked it Jan 11, Uyen rated it really liked it Sep 12, Stian Dalberg rated it it was amazing Jan 11, Zhen rated it liked it Jan 13, Quinn Slobodian rated it really liked it Jan 14, Lauren rated it really liked it Apr 22, Ming rated it really liked it Aug 04, Hyrum Allen rated it really liked it Nov 28, Bianca rated it it was amazing Oct 01, Petr Z rated it liked it Mar 20, Dirk rated it liked it Oct 05, Elec Presnell rated it really liked it Aug 02, Becca rated it liked it Jan 18, There are no discussion topics on this book yet.
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Declassified , Rising Storm 2: University Press of America. There are no discussion topics on this book yet. Unlike the American women who went to Vietnam, both South and North Vietnamese women were enlisted and fought in the combat zone. Rummel estimated that 39, were killed by South Vietnam during the Diem-era in democide from a range of between 16, and , South Vietnamese civilians; for to , Rummel estimated a total of 50, killed in democide, from a range of between 42, and , Their governments subscribed to the Domino theory. Vietnam at War by Mark Philip Bradley.
But that only indicates what a consummate intelligence professional General Davidson is, he was J2 for Westmoreland and Abrams. I did encounter an interesting, perhaps unusual, episode in the book. He takes General Dave Palmer to task for his blunt assertion, in his book Summons of the Trumpet, that attrition is not a strategy.
It represents the complete lack of a strategy, according to Palmer. Davidson then embarks on a very entertaining and interesting argument also lacking complete expression. But, here Davidson stumbles, he knows what the differences are between those earlier wars, excluding WWI, and Vietnam but chooses to ignore them to make his point that Westmoreland was wrongly criticized or too harshly criticized for the strategy he adopted in Vietnam. That is vital and Davidson knows it.
He is a professional. In Vietnam, Johnson and his civilian advisors in Washington purposely surrendered the strategic initiative. It was much more like WWI, without front lines and trenches, and that strategy favors the side that simply outlasts the other, time is the limiting dimension. It is a repugnant, brutal strategic situation that simply wastes lives.
Chasing the crossover point.
Just an unusual episode in his story. General Davidson is troubled by how history will remember General Westmoreland. Davidson has a very positive opinion of Westmoreland and bemoans the negative opinions expressed by some of his detractors. Sorely, a West Point graduate who served in Vietnam, published a book in titled Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. Sorely basically blames Westmoreland for supposedly ignoring pacification and Vietnamization and blames him for the eventual loss of the Republic of Vietnam.
In another book, A Better War: However, the author is not a Westmoreland sycophant, he levels criticisms as well. What Davidson does best in this work is to cover all the important military engagements and analyses and critiques the results. The massive weaknesses of the Vietnamization efforts are clearly described, and I think the eventual failure of building a modern army in South Vietnam is the penultimate tragedy of that war. The ultimate tragedy, of course, is ultimate failure after 25 years of war; beginning with the establishment of MAAG-Indochina in I do have one quibble with the author.
On page the author is continuing his examination of the characteristics the Communists adopted in fighting a revolutionary war. Korea was a limited war. It was the particular type of limited war that McNamara forced the military to accept in Vietnam that was the problem. It did nothing more than begin to fill body bags and the Hanoi Hilton with Americans and litter the countryside with dead Vietnamese. It was a strategy that could not stand up to revolutionary protracted war. His lengthy survey of the multitude of other elements that hobbled the development of the RVNAF into a powerful modern fighting force clearly shows the enormous difficulty the US faced.
In this wonderful and detailed book General Davidson demonstrates that it was the self-imposed limits on the military, lack of a winning strategy, lack of motivation of both the American and South Vietnamese people, the corruption of the GVN and the inability of the US to develop a self-sustaining modern military for the Republic of Vietnam that led ultimately to defeat.
This is an outstanding book and the reader will come away with a very good idea of what happened in Vietnam and the cascading blunders that led to the death of many hundreds of thousands, the end to the Republic of Vietnam and ultimate defeat for America.
General Davidson had the inside track on the Vietnam War, at least from the American side, and for the American portion of the war. As he rightly notes, the war was a Vietnamese war, first against the French with some Vietnamese fighting with the French , then against the Americans with many Vietnamese fighting with the Americans, including the majority in the South , and finally a purely fratricidal war with the stalwart Soviets and Chinese Communists backing the North while the feckless Americans backed and ultimately failed to back the South.
No one was in a better position to understand the American piece of the year war than General Davidson. The primary value of this history is seeing the story through the eyes of a central participant.
The Vietnam War tends to conjure up images of American soldiers battling an elusive enemy in thick jungle, the thudding of helicopters overhead. But there were. Weaving together the histories of three distinct conflicts, Phillip B. Davidson follows the entire course of the Vietnam War, from the initial French skirmishes in .
Davidson researched the French part of the war, and he kept up with the final struggle between the two Vietnams through American reporting and, later, through selected documents obtained from North Vietnamese sources. The core of the book, and the best part, is the central American war that Davidson participated in. Davidson properly thought it important to add the two other parts to present a full history of the Vietnamese struggle. One could question whether or not General Giap deserved the heightened status that Davidson accords him.
Davidson needed some way to tie all the pieces together, and he lit upon Giap as a qualified foil. He was qualified, but probably not the best qualified. There were a number of other Vietnamese, both North and South, who might have been chosen as well. Certainly Ho Chi Minh was the driving force in the North. The problem with picking him was that he died well before the war ended while Giap survived the war.
In the South there was the dominant figure of Ngo Dinh Diem, the one patriot who might have carried off the defense of the South against Ho Chi Minh's aggressive ambitions, but who was, of course, taken out by the blind machinations of Averill Harriman and Henry Cabot Lodge.
Other candidates for the central role in the South were ultimately vanquished by the North, and thus disqualified by being absent at the finish. Davidson's book is superior to any other history written by the time he wrote his book. Subsequent historians, with access to larger documentation and historical pools of information, may well achieve a more definitive historical grasp.