Justice as fairness is politically liberal in that it can be accepted by different individuals each with their own comprehensive views on the good life.
Rawls however refused to extend the reasoning and principles of justice as fairness to the global scale, arguing instead for an alternative law of peoples based only on human rights duties. It is therefore necessary to re-examine the reasons why Rawls refused to extend his contractual concept to a global scale.
Political liberalism, as conceived by Rawls and as employed by cosmopolitanists, consists of two main principles. When applied to an individual inside a politically liberal society, they can be termed negative and positive freedom. On a global scale of justice, both toleration and pluralism are values inherent in liberalism. Hence, depending on the scale of justice, these principles vary in terminology yet only slightly in content.
Globally, the dichotomy is of a larger order and concerns not the content of liberalism, but the validity of political liberalism as a doctrine. These two principles inherent in political liberalism do not only complement each other, but also are alternatively prioritized in different versions of social justice.
However, the capability approach faces the possibility of a trade-off on negative freedom while prioritizing empowerment. The second section of this paper focuses on the global scale. Far from simply rejecting liberalism on a global scale, John Rawls refused to elaborate a cosmopolitan version of his politically liberal justice as fairness concept out of respect for the liberal principle of toleration.
This position can be criticized on several accounts. In light of this trade-off on pluralism in favor of toleration, the capability approach is put forward as an attractive alternative.
What political liberalism means for social justice There are two perspectives for conceiving of the abstract principle of freedom which forms political liberalism. Negative freedom in liberalism is traditionally formulated both as state neutrality towards individual ideas of the good life and neutrality between the individuals as a function of their individual freedom. It is important to recall that these two perspectives on freedom, conceptualized separatly in this abstract manner, are two sides of the coin of political liberalism and mutually enable one another. As will become clear, however, theories of justice tend to epistemologically favor one of the two perspectives.
What it means to enable true individual autonomy through social justice differs largely with the anthropological concept of a theory. Rawls recognizes that in order to provide effective autonomy freedom from constraints has to be complemented by basic rights and resources. Thus surpassing a purely formal definition of liberalism, he has gone to great lengths in a procedural contractarian construct so that the result would be a module of justice which could be accepted by and fit in to various reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
In the original position, his is a theory of rational choice on this point see DeLue based on a situation of complete equality under the veil of ignorance. This is not completely accurate. With regards to liberalism, a reductionist anthropological foundation to justice will lead to privileging negative freedom. The capability approach builds on this criticism of contractarianism to propose a holistic view of tolerance for the individual which takes into account personal concepts of the good life.
Instead of conceiving of justice as a module fitting in to the different reasonable comprehensive doctrines, it represents more of a foundation on which these different doctrines and views of the good life can build. The anthropological picture her theory paints is one of the individual not only as a rational being, but also as an individual characterized by different degrees of vulnerability and different dimensions of belonging.
Together with Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum is not contented with limiting the reach of social justice to the availability basic human goods. According to Martha Nussbaum, by conceiving of the individual as an empty unit or a procedural agent of justice and leaving out essential elements inherent in human interaction, social justice is blocked from doing what liberalism requires of it: Autonomy of a person means that she develops capabilities with the help of justice in order to achieve her own version of functioning.
There are three aspects of the capability approach which indicate, however, a trade-off in negative freedom.
This in turn affects the global applicability of the capability approach. To a certain extent, the more or less global acceptance of basic human rights provides a precedent for a dialogue with the potential for a global overlapping consensus. This step of qualifying preferences is highly controversial from a liberal perspective. As a moderate form of cosmopolitanism Tan , , the capability approach respects the demands of particularist solidarity. In the original position, his is a theory of rational choice on this point see DeLue based on a situation of complete equality under the veil of ignorance. The capability approach builds on this criticism of contractarianism to propose a holistic view of tolerance for the individual which takes into account personal concepts of the good life.
The first difficulty here is that of autonomy and preference. Traditionally, liberalism has tried to expand the latter as much as possible Alexander , Nussbaum tries to uphold this dimension through choice of relevant functioning. In her reasoning, termed internal essentialism, identifying essential, common functionings in human life is the basis for her normative approach. Only in a second step does she then reduce the demands placed on social justice and requires it to provide only the capabilities to function in order to conserve the liberal nature of her theory see Den Uyl and Rasmussen b.
In so far as capabilities are abstracted from functionings, they contain a certain concept of what the good life entails, already providing a frame limiting individual choice. Nussbaum brings choice into line with her essentialist account of a flourishing human life by qualifying preferences.
Put more strongly, an individual might have formed self-destructive or harming principles in reaction to a warped and repressive social environment in which she has long been deprived of relevant capabilities. This step of qualifying preferences is highly controversial from a liberal perspective.
Nussbaum offers no theoretical standard for qualifying when preferences become adaptive and stop being expressions of agency. However, even this definition does not necessarily dismiss what in the capability approach are put off as adaptive preferences. She has chosen the explicitly normative point of view of insisting on the capabilities list even when it goes against individual preferences.
The way she justifies this is by putting autonomy and the major liberties by themselves on the capability list. In adition, as mentioned above, the functioning relative to a capabiltiy is up to an individual's choice, thus limiting the normative view of the good life inherent in the approach. On several occasions, Nussbaum admits to a teleological form of reasoning, in which she departs from a view of the good life through certain functionings and from there derives the capabilities Nussbaum , ; , ; , Thus a life without functioning is not a flourishing life. There is value inherent in functioning itself.
In an empirical application of the capability list, this differentiation would become even more problematic.
Nussbaum allows for numerous exceptions to impose functionings, for example for children and the mentally impaired. Paired with the incomensurability of the capabilities on the list no trade-off is allowed between them , for economic reasons and aspects of justice including taxation and resource redistribution it is easy to imagine situations in which it would be more socially legitimate to provide directly for functioning. In its application, there is a strong case to be made for questioning the capability approache's neutrality and respect of individual choice and responsibility.
Amartya Sen's refusal to define a list of capabilities points to this ambiguity when attempting to provide for effective autonomy Sen , This approach uses the idea of a global contract between individuals to morally justify universal rights or redistributive measures between nations. At the same time, the contractualist approach places far-reaching moral requirements on participation when elaborating transnational principles of justice.
Underlying the cosmopolitan global contract is the assumption that the present global structure and social institutions which bind individuals together across the globe exist already. This assumption makes the global contract vulnerable to the arguments which Rawls himself reasoned with when he refused to simply extend the contract within a politically liberal nation to the global scale.
This constructivist perspective would bind liberal and non-liberal societies together in a liberal contract. If stringently applying methodological individualism, it would have to impose political liberalism onto non-liberal societies. It is in light of this ambiguity of what a global liberal contract entails that Rawls's reasoning will be analysed. This will lead to viewing the capability approach of an attractive alternative to the constructivist theories. Its respect for both the freedom of individuals and communities allows us to avoid the contradiction between the scales of liberalism.
John Rawls is one of these authors. Toleration has liberated itself of the methodological individualism on which political liberalism is based and is given priority over liberalism itself. The asymmetry in comparisson to justice as fairness is that this new concept respects groups of people instead of individuals. These non-liberal societies can be ones with apartheid or other discriminatory practices Caney , The critical issue then becomes toleration. Rawls views his global contract as tolerant in a way particularly pertinent to the ideal of political liberalism, which as a principle includes both the idea of rights and liberties and the idea of mutual toleration.
Leçons de philosophie politique moderne, Les violences de l'abstraction (French Edition) eBook: Michel Terestchenko: uzotoqadoh.tk: Kindle Store. de nombreuses controverses au sein de la philosophie politique libérale In conclusion, the capability approach overcomes Rawls's stunted version of . the modern world must, it seems to me, be a form of political liberalism. .. Leçons de philosophie politique moderne, Les violences de l'abstraction.
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